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 Much management accounting research focuses on design of incentive compensation 
contracts. A basic assumption in these contracts is that performance-based incentives improve 
employee performance. This paper reports on a field test of the multi-period incentive effects of 
a performance-based compensation plan on the sales of a retail establishment. Analysis of panel 
data for 15 retail outlets over 66 months indicates a sales increase when the plan is implemented, 
an effect that persists and increases over time. Sales gains are significantly lower in the peak 
selling season when more temporary workers are employed. 
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Introduction 
 
 Over the past two decades much management accounting research has addressed the 
optimal design of incentive compensation contracts. Theoretical models are developed based on 
the assumption that monetary incentives can improve performance by inducing higher levels of 
effort. Considerable empirical research in accounting and economics has investigated the 
predictions of these models by examining the structure of executive compensation contracts and 
their link with firm performance. While this prior research primarily examines the structure of 
compensation contracts for top executives, our focus is on the impact of a pay-for-performance 
plan implemented for front-line workers. Specifically, we report on a field test of the multi-
period incentive effects of a performance-based compensation plan implemented by a major 
retailer for its sales consultants. 
 Many firms have recently implemented output-based incentive plans that link 
compensation to measured performance for employees at every level, not just for those at the top 
(Schlesinger and Heskett, 1991b). Interest in the effect of such incentive plans on worker 
performance dates back at least to the scientific management studies of Taylor (1911). Much of 
the related evidence, however, is either anecdotal, or limited to analysis of data for relatively 
short periods of time without controlling for other factors influencing performance. Some 
empirical and experimental evidence reported in the organization behavior and related literatures, 
in fact, cautions against expecting the provision of monetary incentives to translate into 
improved performance (Pearce, Stevensen, and Perry, 1985; Hogarth et al, 1991).
1
 
                                                          
1
 In the organization behavior literature dating back to the 1960s, expectancy theory (Vroom, 1964) and 
goal-setting theory research (Locke, Bryan, and Kendall, 1968) based on laboratory experiments suggest a 
link between monetary incentives and performance under controlled situations. However, cognitive 
constraints limiting the ability of human decision makers to process complex long-term implications of 
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 In contrast to the prior research in these literatures, our study presents a longitudinal 
examination of the multi-period impact of an incentive plan at several stores operated by a major 
firm in the department store industry. The stated objective of this plan is to motivate sales 
personnel to provide enhanced customer service. The plan provides sales personnel with a bonus 
payment, in addition to their base hourly wage, for exceeding a prespecified sales goal. It also 
provides for possible termination of employment in case the sales target is not met in two 
consecutive quarters. Monetary incentives are particularly important in this firm because they 
comprise about 20% of base wages, and other reward mechanisms such as promotions are not 
readily available in a relatively flat organization. Prior to the plan’s implementation, salesforce 
compensation was based primarily on seniority, not performance. Moreover, the firm 
implemented the plan on different calendar dates at only 15 of the 34 retail outlets it operates 
over a relatively homogeneous geographic region. This provides us with a natural control group 
for our study. 
 Economic theory of incentives predicts that the implementation of a sales- based bonus 
plan induces greater effort and also attracts more productive workers and, therefore, on average 
higher levels of sales are realized. Furthermore, the theory predicts that any realized sales gains 
on implementation persist and even increase as workforce composition changes. Sales gains will 
increase if customer service is enhanced as expected by firm management because customer 
satisfaction results in repeat customer purchases in subsequent periods. Finally, because 
temporary employees cannot trade-off current customer service effort against future multi-period 
payoffs due to repeat sales to customers, the extent of sales gains is predicted to be lower in peak 
sales periods when more temporary workers are employed. Our econometric analysis of pooled 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
their actions, and the potentially adverse signal conveyed by monetary incentives when tasks are 
interesting for their own sake, have been suggested in this literature as limiting the descriptive validity of 
this theoretical link in actual multi-period settings. 
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cross-sectional and time-series data for 15 outlets over a 66-month period provides empirical 
support for these period-specific hypotheses. 
 The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the research site and the nature of 
the performance-based contract. Section 3 develops the hypotheses to be tested based on 
predictions from economic theory of incentives. The model and estimation procedures are 
described in Section 4. Empirical results are discussed in Section 5 and sensitivity analysis is 
presented in Section 6. Concluding remarks are offered in Section 7. 
 
Research Site 
Incentive plans in the retail industry 
 The past decade has evidenced a concerted effort by many firms to motivate employees 
to improve performance. Twenty-three percent of the firms in a Coopers and Lybrand (1992) 
survey indicated that they are implementing new performance-based incentive plans for their 
employees. In order to deliver quality customer service, many retailers such as Nordstrom, 
Bloomingdale’s, Rich’s, Macy’s, Carter Hawley Hale, and the Bon (in Boise, Idaho), have 
implemented or expanded their incentive pay plans (Ginsberg 1989; Barmash, 1989; Lloyd, 
1989). Schlesinger and Heskett (1991a) report that Nordstrom, Younkers, and Dayton Hudson 
have implemented performance-based compensation plans intended to produce ‘extra employee 
effort’ leading to ‘extraordinarily responsive service’. An Ernst and Young survey of the retail 
industry (Bivins, 1989) indicates that most department stores currently offer incentive programs 
such as straight commissions, base salary plus commission, and quota bonus programs. Although 
these programs can add to payroll costs, the survey respondents indicated that they believe these 
plans have contributed to major improvements in customer service. 
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 Not all retailers, however, are pleased with the performance implications of their output-
based plans. Women’s Wear Daily (January 16, 1991) reports that Carter Hawley Hale Stores cut 
its sales commission dramatically and returned to an hourly wage system in four of its divisions. 
Sears faced a union-organizing drive and a lawsuit from employees. The Wall Street Journal 
(Schwadel, January 13, 1990) reports: ‘The fuss at Sears... reflects industry-wide skepticism 
among salespeople about retailers’ efforts to shift their compensation to commissions from 
guaranteed hourly wages’. Moreover, Simons and Weston (1991) cite complaints by Nordstrom 
employees which suggest that focusing behavior on retail sales can lead to a feeling of intense 
competition among sales consultants which, in turn, can result in resentment that they are being 
‘used’ by management.2 
 An article in Forbes (Koselka, 1991) notes a 36% increase in retail square footage and a 
drop of 16% in retail sales per square foot in the last decade, and suggests that increasing sales 
productivity has become a competitive necessity for most retail firms. A New York Times article 
(Stevenson, August 27, 1989) reports: ‘After years of concentrating on keeping costs low and 
luring customers with constant rounds of sale prices, the large department and apparel stores 
increasingly see competent service from an efficient, cheerful sales staff as the key to success in 
an increasingly competitive retailing environment...(Nordstrom’s) success has spurred (its) 
rivals... to initiate strategies like putting salespeople on commission, a step they hope will foster 
more helpful attitudes in their employees.’ A competitive strategy that features customer service 
led the firm that is the subject of our study to consider using an incentive compensation plan as a 
means to increase sales at its retail outlets. 
                                                          
2
 Baker (1990, p. Dl) writes: ‘...dissent salespeople complain about intense competition between 
salespeople. Often cited is the court case in King County, Washington, where a jury awarded $180,000 to 
a former Nordstrom saleswoman who claimed that she was wrongfully dismissed because co-workers 
wrote anonymous letters claiming that she stole from them by falsely crediting herself with their 
commissions’. 
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Implementation of incentive plan 
 Our research site is a national retail firm that operates a number of department stores 
selling similar merchandise. While the stores cover a large geographic area, most of the stores 
are located in or near shopping malls or urban areas. The company initiated its performance-
based incentive plan in 1987 to support its stated firm-wide strategy of ‘customer emphasis’ with 
‘employee empowerment’. Examination of internal correspondence related to the design of the 
incentive plan indicated that management expected the plan to result in further enhancement of 
customer service and consequently in an increase in store sales. Documents distributed to the 
workers describing the plan also stressed enhanced customer service as its objective. 
 While we initially selected the firm because of our access to its senior managers, we 
pursued this research study because it presented a unique opportunity for an experimental design 
that allowed us to specify and test formal hypotheses about multi-period impacts of the incentive 
contract. We spent a total of 196 hours at the research site interviewing personnel from human 
resources, finance, accounting, information systems, and stores departments; meeting with staff 
working directly with store personnel; visiting retail stores; and collecting relevant data from the 
company’s accounting records. 
 The plan was implemented in stores sequentially as company managers intended to 
examine and evaluate the plan’s impact on sales and customer satisfaction. Initially, the firm 
selected one store from a group of similar stores to begin the implementation. By the end of 
1988, four stores had implemented the plan and another seven were added in 1989. In 1990, four 
more stores implemented the plan, bringing the total to 15 out of a total of 34 in this geographic 
region. Senior managers in finance, human resources, and stores (sales) departments involved in 
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the design and implementation of the plan assured us that stores were chosen initially for 
implementation only because they were representative of others. Detailed examination of internal 
correspondence did not reveal any other special consideration in their selection. Company 
managers decided to hold back some stores until they had assessed the plan’s impact on 
salesforce performance. They closely monitored the sales of the first few stores that implemented 
the new compensation plan by comparing their sales against the sales of a control group of 
stores. Sequential implementation was also necessitated by the limited number of headquarter 
staff personnel who were present on site during the initial phases of a store’s implementation to 
explain plan details. 
 The performance-based incentive plan is best described as a bonus program. At the time 
of the plan’s implementation, sales consultants received little in the form of annual merit 
increases, and promotions were rare. Bonus payment became the only significant reward for high 
performance. Each week sales consultants are paid a base hourly rate times hours worked. Under 
the plan sales consultants can increase their remuneration by receiving a cash bonus at the end of 
each quarter if the quarterly sales generated by the employee exceed a quarterly sales goal. 
Failure to meet the goal in two successive quarters may result in termination of employment. 
Prespecified sales goals are established for each employee based only on the individual’s base 
hourly rate, and department or merchandise group. The bonus is computed as a fixed percentage 
of the excess sales (actual sales minus prespecified sales goal) by the employee in a quarter. 
Under the plan, sales department supervisors and managers are also paid a quarterly bonus as a 
percentage of excess sales. The bonus percentage for these managers is set at one half the bonus 
rate used for sales consultants. Hence, all operations personnel at the stores who are directly 
responsible for customer service are covered by the new incentive compensation plan. 
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 Senior managers regarded the incentive plan as a major change for the firm and its 
salesforce. They expected that the new incentive scheme would motivate many changes in 
employee behavior that would enhance customer service. Sales consultants were now expected 
to build a client base to generate repeat sales. Actions consistent with this approach include 
developing and updating customer address lists (including details of their needs and preferences), 
writing thank you notes, contacting customers about upcoming sales and new merchandise that 
matched their preferences, and retrieving merchandise from other departments. These changes in 
the activities of the salesforce necessitated changes in the role of sales managers. After the plan’s 
implementation, the managers became responsible for supporting the consultants’ customer 
service activities and their role became more of a facilitator as sales personnel gained more 
autonomy. The plan’s implementation also required managers to deal with the administrative 
problems that result from the plan, such as consultants’ demands for prime selling hours, 
disputes over credit for sales, and instruction to employees who had sub-par selling performance. 
 To aid the transition, plan implementation was preceded by a number of question and 
answer sessions and store visits by corporate staff. Prior to actually beginning the plan a party 
was staged for all store personnel. Corporate staff remained on site for a few months to help store 
management with the implementation. Because of the many changes, management expected that 
any sales increases might occur gradually as employees learned how to provide a higher level of 
service to customers and developed their client base. Personnel managers indicated to us that in 
November and December temporary employees are used extensively. Company documents 
examined by us confirmed that compared to the other ten months, the increase in total hours 
employed in both plan and nonplan stores is almost 20% in November and December. Company 
officials were concerned that most temporary employees would have limited opportunity to use 
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these new selling strategies emphasizing customer service. Therefore, although they expected 
sales to increase upon implementation of the plan, and detailed contingent analyses had been 
prepared, they recognized that assessing the magnitude and persistence of sales gains given the 
many complexities of the plan and its environment was difficult. 
 
Development of Hypotheses 
 
 Agency theory is one paradigm that suggests a value for performance-based 
compensation. Examples of agency-theoretic models for examining salesforce compensation 
include Basu, Lai, Srinivasan, and Staelin (1985), Lai and Staelin (1986), and Rao (1990). John 
and Weitz (1989) and Coughlan and Narasimhan (1992) use questionnaire surveys to examine 
factors influencing salesforce compensation structure. Empirical research on executive 
compensation contracts also draws on agency theory to evaluate the link between compensation 
and alternative measures of performance (e.g., Jensen and Zimmerman, 1985; Murphy, 1985; 
Coughlan and Schmidt, 1985; Benston, 1985; Gibbs, 1995; Holthausen, Larcker, and Sloan, 
1995). For instance, studies such as Lambert and Larcker (1987) and Sloan (1992) provide 
limited evidence in support of Banker and Datar’s (1989) result that the weights placed on 
different performance signals, such as stock returns and accounting returns, are proportional to 
the sensitivity and precision of the signals. Antle and Smith (1986) and Jensen and Murphy 
(1990) find little empirical support for Holmström’s (1982) theoretical result that top executive 
contracts are optimally based on relative performance measures. However, Gibbons and Murphy 
(1990) find limited evidence that executive compensation is related to industry-adjusted rates of 
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return. In an important article, Baker, Jensen, and Murphy (1988) synthesize the research in this 
field and reconcile empirical evidence with economic analysis of incentive contracts. 
 In the basic agency model, a principal designs a contract to motivate a risk- and effort-
averse agent to exert unobservable effort in a production process that is characterized by 
uncertainty. Two optimization assumptions are maintained in this model. First, the principal is 
assumed to optimally choose a contract based on observable performance signals. Next, given 
the compensation contract, the agent is assumed to optimally trade-off disutility for higher effort 
against expected utility for higher incentive compensation resulting from improved performance. 
At our field research site, the intent of the management was to test and fine-tune the incentive 
plan that was implemented for front-line workers. Consequently, we do not expect that this 
performance-based incentive plan is optimal under the realized conditions nor do we test for its 
optimality.
3
 Our objective instead is to examine whether the performance of the agents changed 
on the implementation of the new incentive plan as if they were optimizing their effort choices 
given the contract. 
 
Plan effect 
 Sales personnel in the retail industry expend considerable effort to provide customer 
service and to promote and obtain sales. At our research site, straight salary had been used for 
the salesforce prior to incentive plan implementation. To the extent these flat salary levels were 
above the workers’ going rate, efficiency wage theory suggests that employees had the incentive 
                                                          
3
 Jensen and Murphy (1990, p. 246) note: ‘the structure of the Holmström model makes its conclusions 
irrelevant to most compensation contracts ... His model assumes that the principal knows the utility 
function of the (agents) as well as the production function relating actions to expected outcomes... (T)his 
means that (the principal) knows with certainty all possible actions of the (agents)... the distribution of 
outcomes of each action... (and) the set of optimal... actions. It is unlikely that these conditions are often 
satisfied’. 
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to exert higher than the minimal effort in order to maintain their current employment. Further, to 
the extent that sales supervisors and managers provided (imperfect) monitoring of sales 
consultants’ effort, consultants were motivated to direct their effort in the desired direction. 
However, supervisory monitoring continued after the implementation of the new incentive plan, 
and the base salary under the new plan was maintained at the old level. Therefore, agency theory 
predicts that the implementation of this new performance-based incentive contract will induce 
the sales consultants and managers to exert greater effort to generate more sales.
4
 
 Performance-based incentives also have the effect of revealing the intrinsic productivity 
of sales consultants unknown to the firm (Murphy, 1986). If the more productive workers have 
the better outside opportunities, implementation of a pay-for-performance system ‘amounts to 
offering a menu because it allows employees to determine their compensation by how hard they 
choose to work. Indeed, paying a wage that is based on measured performance tends to attract 
and retain the most productive job applicants and to discourage the least productive, to the 
employer’s benefit’ (Milgrom and Roberts 1992, p. 157). As a result, with more productive sales 
consultants, we expect sales to increase on the implementation of the new performance-based 
incentive plan. To test this basic prediction, we specify the following hypothesis: 
 
                                                          
4
 The ability of the incentive plan to motivate increased effort by employees may be attenuated by 
potential ratcheting effects. The ratcheting effect is a multi-period incentive problem which arises from 
the tendency of firms to use the most current performance as a criterion in determining the next period’s 
goal (Weitzman, 1980; Homans. 1952). For instance, Clawson (1980) finds that because employers 
always adjusted the rate they paid to piecework employees downward, piecework incentives rarely 
worked in the early 1900’s as workers quickly learned to restrict output. Discussions with senior 
managers at our research site, however, indicated that performance goals under the plan were based on 
industry standards and therefore they did not intend to make any adjustments. Examination of company 
records also confirmed that no changes occurred during the period of our study. Therefore, we do not 
expect that dysfunctional behavior was induced by the ratcheting phenomenon. 
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H1: Ceteris paribus, sales increase following the implementation of the performance-
based compensation plan. 
 
 While the economic arguments supporting this hypothesis are intuitive, prior work in the 
organization theory literature presents contrary evidence. Pearce, Stevensen, and Perry (1985) 
report no discernable effect on performance when a new incentive compensation plan based on 
performance measures such as claim turnaround time was implemented for social security 
administrators. Reviewing experimental research, Hogarth et al. (1991, p. 735) state: ‘It would be 
naive to assert that incentives always improve performance’. They cite Deci and Ryan (1985), 
Lepper, Greene, and Nisbett (1973), and Levine and Fasnacht (1974) who report that in 
performing a task that subjects find intrinsically interesting, introduction of monetary incentives 
decreases subsequent interest and performance because incentives are ‘experienced as 
controlling and they frequently convey a sense of incompetence’.5 
 Behavioral research in accounting also questions the ability of monetary incentives to 
improve performance. Awasthi and Pratt (1990) report that provision of monetary incentives 
does not result in improved performance for subjects with low intuitive and perceptual abilities 
to perform a complex task. Ashton (1990) appeals to prior research in psychology (Condry, 
1977; Guzzo, Jette, and Katzell, 1985; Jenkins, 1986; McGraw, 1978; Thaler, 1986) that 
suggests that while financial incentives improve performance if the task is ‘boring or 
monotonous’ or if ‘solutions involve straightforward, perhaps mechanical solution procedures 
                                                          
5
 Similar arguments are also presented in popular magazines. For instance, Kohn (1988) states that 
monetary rewards ‘encourage people to focus narrowly on a task, to do it as quickly as possible, and to 
take few risks ... Extrinsic rewards can erode intrinsic interest ... (and), people come to see themselves a 
being controlled by a reward’. See also Baker, Jensen, and Murphy (1988) for a review of this literature. 
They note in particular that it is not that monetary incentives do not work, rather they work too well in 
focusing attention to measured outcomes linked with incentives to the exclusion of other desired 
outcomes. 
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that clearly exist’, such incentives are detrimental if the task is ‘interesting for its own sake’ and 
if it involves ‘neither a clear solution procedure nor an obvious way to create or discover one’. 
Ashton finds that monetary incentives increase performance pressure on a subject, and the 
increased pressure harms performance when the task is demanding and has a high level of 
preexisting pressure.
6
 Because enhanced customer service requires more creative application of 
effort by sales consultants in a high pressure setting where poor performance may result in 
termination of employment, the above studies suggest that the introduction of monetary 
incentives may have a detrimental effect on performance. Our study, therefore, serves as a test of 
the external validity of these experiments. 
 
Year effect 
 The conventional wisdom in the retail industry is that monetary incentives linking pay to 
performance motivate sales consultants to provide better customer service (Schwadel, 1990). 
Discussions with company personnel and examination of company documents revealed that a 
similar expectation about enhancement in customer service existed at our research site when the 
new pay-for-performance plan was implemented. The agency-theoretic notion of ‘higher effort’ 
translates in the retail industry into sales consultants developing and maintaining greater 
information about the wants of the customers, and working to satisfy those wants, thus leading to 
a higher level of customer satisfaction. While these actions drive current-period sales, they will 
increase future sales as well, as sales personnel build their own client bases and satisfied 
customers generate repeat purchases. The cumulative benefits from a sustained higher level of 
                                                          
6
 In contrast to these papers, Libby and Lipe (1992) document in their experimental study that 
performance-based incentives increase effort, and consequently improve performance, when the outcome 
is sensitive to the effort level. 
IMPACT OF A PERFORMANCE-BASED INCENTIVE PLAN   15 
effort under the incentive plan imply, therefore, that the sales gains in subsequent periods will be 
greater than the gains obtained immediately on implementation. 
 A concern about this prediction stems from the possible multidimensionality of agents’ 
effort. If the sales consultants direct more effort to enhance customer service, as company 
management expects, then both current and future sales will increase. However, sales consultants 
may direct their effort to increase current sales without enhancing customer service. For instance, 
a Wall Street Journal article (Yin, 1992) reports the California Department of Consumer Affairs’ 
finding that Sears, Roebuck & Co. overcharged auto-repair customers nearly 90% of the time, by 
an average of $223, for additional and more expensive repairs than were needed. The department 
believed that the overcharges resulted because of pressure on repairmen to meet quotas of parts 
and service repair sales for every eight-hour shift. 
 Such behavior is predicted by Holmström and Milgrom’s (1991) two-dimensional effort 
model where the outcome (e.g., customer service) of one of the effort dimensions cannot be 
measured at all. If monetary incentives are based on the outcome (e.g., current sales) of the other 
effort dimension, then dysfunctional behavior ensues with excessive effort being directed to the 
effort dimension being rewarded by performance-based incentives. However, in a multi-period 
situation such as the one we encounter at our research site, sales in future periods serves as a 
comparable, though less precise, measure of the customer service effort dimension. Therefore, 
agents will consider the two measures (current sales and future sales) on which their monetary 
incentives are based, and both the precision and the sensitivity of the two measures will influence 
the impact of incentives on effort (Banker and Datar, 1989; Feltham and Xie, 1994). To the 
extent that the customer at a department store is as well informed about his/her wants as the 
salesperson (unlike the auto-repair case mentioned earlier), the ability of a salesperson to 
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increase current sales without providing better customer service is limited. Therefore, the 
sensitivity of the measure (future sales) for customer service effort dimension is higher, even 
though its precision is lower than that of the short-horizon (current sales) effort dimension. As a 
result, for salespersons with a longer multi-period decision horizon, provision of incentives based 
on sales performance is likely to enhance effort along both dimensions, rather than only one to 
the exclusion of the other as in the Holmström-Milgrom model. 
 Sales gains are also expected to increase over time if provision of incentives motivates 
employees to learn improved ways of performing their tasks over time. Economic theory 
suggests that workers with a longer multi-period decision horizon will devote some of their effort 
to learn more productive ways to perform their tasks if they are provided incentives based on 
improved performance. Latham and Dossett (1978), for instance, found that incentive wages led 
to animal trappers learning new ways to identify ‘active’ animal lairs. Learning effects occur as 
workers become more familiar with their new responsibilities, adopting more productive 
procedures and eliminating unproductive activities (Wagner, Rubin, and Callahan, 1988).
7
 
 Sales gains may also increase over time as less effective employees, unhappy with the 
new performance evaluation program, leave and are replaced by personnel with higher intrinsic 
ability, who prefer output-based compensation plans (Rao, 1990). As noted earlier, economic 
theory suggests that in such adverse selection situations involving a pool of workers with 
different levels of intrinsic ability, a contract that is contingent on performance will induce a 
separating equilibrium with the higher-ability workers optimally accepting the contingent 
contract and the lower-ability workers rejecting it. In effect, we expect that over time the firm 
                                                          
7
 However, recent behavioral studies (Kanfer and Ackerman, 1989; Wood, Bandura, and Bailey, 1990) 
suggest that the presence of monetary incentives diverts needed attention from ‘a concern about how to 
do' a complex task to ‘how well one is doing’, thus inhibiting learning of that task. Such a shorter-term 
focus on current output implies that sales gains will not increase over time if sales personnel do not invest 
their effort in learning the complex tasks in retail selling. 
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will attract more high-ability workers and retain such workers already in its employment, but 
lose the lower-ability workers in its employment at the time the new incentive contract was 
implemented. 
 That sales gains will increase over time is predicted by all three explanations: the effect 
of increased customer satisfaction, the effect of consultants learning improved methods, and the 
adverse selection effect of attracting more productive workers. With our data limited only to 
store sales during our sample period, we cannot discriminate between these competing 
explanations. Instead, we limit ourselves to the more modest task of testing the following 
hypothesis: 
 
H2: Ceteris paribus, sales gains realized on the implementation of the 
performance-based incentive plan persist and increase over time. 
 
 In contrast, sales increases realized during the initial stages of the new plan may be 
explained by the fact that the sales personnel are being given special attention and are enjoying 
the novel experience. To the extent such a placebo or so-called Hawthorne Effect 
(Roethlisberger, 1977) is driving performance, sales gains are expected to diminish or even 
disappear over time (Schlesinger and Heskett, 1991a). While the Hawthorne experiments are 
popularly associated with the effect of temporary productivity gains arising only because of 
increased attention during the experiment, careful statistical analysis of the Hawthorne data has 
revealed a persistent gain due to a learning effect in the presence of increased monetary 
incentives and performance feedback (Parsons, 1974; Pitcher, 1981). An alternative reason to 
expect only transient gains is that they arise because of increased monitoring associated with the 
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presence of corporate staff during the implementation phase of the plan. Performance gains 
attributable to this increased monitoring diminish as the involvement of corporate staff at the 
plan site and in carefully watching and comparing store sales is reduced. 
 
Seasonal effect 
 The seasonal nature of the retail business requires firms to hire temporary employees 
during busy seasons. This fact motivates a further hypothesis derived from the multi-period 
nature of the impact of higher effort. A permanent sales consultant will take into account the 
present value of expected future bonuses, and weigh it against the disutility for higher effort. In 
contrast, a temporary employee has only a short-term focus. This difference in incentives implies 
that a permanent sales consultant will work more to build a client base than a temporary 
salesperson.
8
 If improved customer service is the predominant means for increasing sales, then 
the lower effort by temporary workers implies lower sales, on average. In a similar vein, because 
temporary workers have less incentive to devote effort to learn the retail selling task, they will 
exhibit lower sales gains. Also, temporary workers may not be as skilled as permanent workers 
in providing superior customer service and, as a result, the introduction of the incentive plan may 
not result in as high an improvement in performance. We hypothesize, therefore, that the higher 
the proportion of temporary salespeople on the sales floor, the lower the impact of the 
performance-based program on sales. Because retailers hire considerably more temporary part-
time employees for fourth-quarter (holiday season) business, we expect the sales impact of 
performance-based incentives to be smaller in the fourth quarter than in the other three quarters. 
                                                          
8
 Schlesinger and Heskett (1991b) report that Sears found from its 1989 customer survey that ‘the more a 
store relied on a continually changing group of part-timers…the lower the customer ratings it received. 
The higher its percentage of full-time and regular part-time workers, the more satisfied customers said 
they felt'. 
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Furthermore, many more transient rather than repeat customers shop in the holiday season. 
Because it is more difficult to provide high levels of service to nonregular customers, the 
incentive effects of the plan are reduced during the holiday season. Therefore, we test the 
following hypothesis: 
 
H3: Ceteris paribus, the impact of the performance-based contract on sales in the 
fourth quarter is less than its impact in the other three quarters. 
 
 In contrast, if temporary workers can take actions that promote current sales, sacrificing 
future sales as in the Holmström-Milgrom (1991) model, they will have the incentive under the 
new compensation contract to do so; and as a result sales would increase in the period when 
more temporary workers are used. For instance, a temporary sales consultant will have incentives 






 Empirical testing of the hypotheses derived in the previous section involves assessing the 
impact of the incentive plan on store sales. We obtained monthly store sales reports for a 66-
month period (from February 1986 to July 1991) for the 15 stores that implemented the incentive 
plan and the 19 other stores in the same geographic region that did not. To estimate the plan’s 
                                                          
9
 Empirical evidence from prior research in the retailing literature suggests that part-time labor has a 
positive influence on sales productivity, and this influence is stronger for stores that emphasize customer 
service rather than stores that are primarily self-service (Thurik and Van der Wijst, 1984). One reason for 
this effect is that temporary employees seek full-time jobs within the organization, and expect to improve 
their prospects by exhibiting superior performance. Provision of monetary incentives therefore may not 
appreciably enhance this existing incentive. 
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effect we specify the following model of sales in month             , of each store     
        , that implemented the plan: 
                                   
         
  
   
 
      
    
               
    
          
      
                
    
           
      
    
               
 
where 
        = sales of store   in month  , 
          
= average sales in month   of 19 ‘control’ stores that did not 
implement the incentive plan, 
         
= average monthly sales of store   in fiscal year February 1986 to 
January 1987, 
   = 1 if store  , otherwise zero, 
   
  = 1 if store is on the incentive plan, otherwise zero, 
   
  
= 1 if store has been on the incentive plan for at least one year, 
otherwise zero, 
   
 
 = 1 if fourth quarter of fiscal year, otherwise zero. 
 
 In this formulation store sales are specified as an intercept as plus a multiple (  ) of  
         . The   parameters vary across stores principally due to relative store size; stores 
larger than the average ‘control’ store have  ’s greater than one, smaller stores less than one. We 
compute the           measure for each month f using the 19 stores that did not implement 
the plan and thus control for changes in sales over time because of the potentially unique selling 
strategies of the firm as well as seasonal and regional economy-wide effects. We estimate the 
model’s parameters using pooled time-series data over a 66-month period and cross-sectionally 
for the 15 stores that implemented the incentive plan. 
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 Observe that we multiply each intercept shift term (the three terms with coefficients   , 
  , and   ) by         , the average monthly sales for stores in fiscal year February 1986 to 
January 1987, the first year in our sample. If we had not multiplied by         , then the 
model would have implicitly restricted the impact of the plan to be equal across all 15 stores. 
But, intuitively, we expect sales gains to be higher for larger stores and lower for smaller stores. 
We examined this issue by estimating the model in (1) without multiplying the three terms by 
        , and correlating its residuals for months subsequent to the plan’s implementation with 
        for each store. This correlation is significantly positive (p = 0.002) indicating that the 
plan impact varies directly with store size, and model (1) estimates will be potentially biased if 
we do not multiply the three intercept shift terms by SALES86 for each store. 
 We test for the hypothesized effects of the incentive plan on sales by examining the 
intercept shift coefficients,   ,   ,   , and slope shift coefficients,   ,   ,   , in model (1). A 
positive   is interpreted as the incentive plan having a positive effect on sales. We estimate three 
versions of the model in (1), first with only slope shifts (setting           ), second with 
only intercept shifts (setting           ), and third with both slope and intercept shifts. 
The slope- shift model assumes that the impact of incentive plans is proportional to the 
         measure that varies considerably over time due to seasonal and economic factors, 
but is invariant across stores. The intercept-shift model assumes that plan impact is invariant 
over time except for the second-year and fourth-quarter effects modeled explicitly in (1). By 
estimating the three different versions of model (1), we seek to demonstrate the robustness of our 
results. 
 The first hypothesis,   , states that sales increase on the implementation of the incentive 
plan. We test this hypothesis by examining whether the    (or   ) coefficient is greater than zero. 
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The second hypothesis,   , states that sales gains increase over time, and is evaluated by 
examining whether    (or   ) is greater than zero. If the change in performance during plan 
implementation is only due to the Hawthorne Effect, then a decrease in plan impact over time is 
expected, as reflected in    (or   ) being less than zero. Finally, the third hypothesis,   , states 
that sales gains are negatively related to the presence of temporary employees. Therefore, we test 
whether the average impact of the plan on fourth-quarter sales, when temporary employment is 
high, is less than that of the other three quarters, as reflected in    (or   ) being less than zero. 
 Because we use time-series information to estimate the effect of the incentive plan on 
sales, serial correlation may bias the standard errors of the coefficients. We control for 
autocorrelation by using a variant of the Prais-Winsten (1954) estimator proposed by Park and 
Mitchell (1980) to make first-order autocorrelation adjustments to the variables. This estimator is 
consistent and performs especially well for short time series and trended data relative to several 
other estimators (Doran and Griffiths, 1983). It also reduces the extent to which the 
autocorrelation coefficient tends to be underestimated (Kmenta and Gilbert, 1970). We test the 
hypotheses using the parameter estimates from the regression using the transformed variables. 
 We also expect to find heteroscedasticity, as the observations for larger stores are likely 
to have bigger variances. The initial OLS results using the Glesjer (1969) test confirm this 
suspicion as the absolute error terms are significantly correlated (Pearson correlation = 0.501, 
Spearman correlation = 0.376,         ) with the square root of store size measured in square 
feet. Therefore, we conduct weighted-least-squares (WLS) estimation under the assumption that 
error term variances are proportional to square feet of store space. We also conduct tests using 
White’s (1980) procedure to obtain consistent estimates of the standard errors from an OLS 
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 Table 1 presents average statistics on store sales and square footage by existence of the 
incentive plan as of the end of our sample period. Because of the sensitivity of the information, 
the data have been disguised by multiplying by a scalar. The median square feet for the incentive 
plan and nonplan stores are identical, and the difference in the means is not statistically 
significant. There are also no statistically significant differences in store size measured in sales 
for fiscal year 1987-88, the year incentive-plan implementation began. This finding is consistent 
with management’s intent to initially select representative stores for implementation to help 
assess the impact of the performance-based compensation plan. As expected, the average sales 
for the plan stores have grown more than those for the nonplan stores by fiscal year 1990-91, the 
last complete year in our sample, but the difference is not statistically significant. Table 2 
presents a comparison of three key financial ratios for the plan and nonplan stores. There are no 
statistically significant differences in inventory/sales, and cost of sales/sales ratios for 1987-88 or 
1990-91. The support expenses/sales ratio is greater on average for the nonplan stores, the 
difference is statistically significant for 1990-91. 
 




Insert Table 2 Here 
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 Fig. 1 presents a plot of the average standardized sales residuals for the 15 plan stores. 
The residuals are aligned in event time with month 0 representing the date of the plan’s 




                           
where    and    are stimated using data for up to 24 months prior to the implementation date. 
The graph reveals a steep increase in sales in the month of the plan’s implementation, and that 
the sales gains persist and increase over the 24-month period following the implementation date. 
Statistical tests of the nature of performance change follow. 
 




Insert Figure 1 Here 
 
 
 To assess the effect of the incentive plan on store sales, we present in Table 3 the results 
of WLS estimation of the regression model with Park-Mitchell transformations of the variables. 
Because there are numerous stores, we report only the coefficients relating to the incentive plan. 
The regression on the left (column 1) reports results of estimating the following model, 
restricting the intercept shifts in model (1) to be zero: 
                                                          
10
 Residuals are standardized by dividing by the square-root of estimated variances, where the out-of-
sample prediction error variances include an adjustment for increasing variance (Johnston, 1984, p. 43). 
The apparent increase in monthly variability after the implementation date is explained by the fact that the 
number of observations decreases over time because of the sequential implementation of the plan. 
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 Individual store coefficients    ranged between 0.503 and 2.265, and averaged 1.140. 
The estimated    coefficient is 0.105 with a  -statistic of 8.94, indicating that the incentive plan 
had a statistically significant positive effect on sales, thus supporting our first hypothesis. The 
estimated    coefficient (0.051,  -statistic 3.73) reveals that the impact of the incentive plan 
increases significantly over time, supporting our second hypothesis. There is no indication that 
the impact of the plan has diminished over time and, therefore, the presence of the Hawthorne 
Effect as the primary driver of sales gains during the early stages of implementation is not 
directly supported by the data. It is possible, however, that the increase over time due to the 
multi-period effect of incentives is being partially offset by an initial period Hawthorne Effect. 
The estimated    coefficient is — 0.056 with a  -value of — 4.72. This supports our third 
hypothesis that the sales impact of the plan is lower in the fourth quarter due to the higher 
proportion of temporary employees in this quarter. 
 The estimated   coefficients can be used to assess percentage increase in sales after the 
implementation of the incentive plan. The estimated average sales for a plan store   increase 
from    times          to (     ) times          in the first year (except fiscal quarter 
4) after implementation, and to (        ) times          in the second year. Because the 
average    is 1.14 across all 15 stores, the average percentage increase is approximately       
    . The results in Table 3 imply that the average increase is about 9.2% (=0.105/1.14) in the 
first year after plan implementation and 13.7% ( = (0.105 + 0.051)/1.14) in the second year. 
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 We present the results of estimating the intercept-shift-only version of model (1) in 
column 2 of Table 3. In this case, we estimate the following equation assuming error variances 
proportional to store size (WLS): 
                                   
         
  
   
 
      
    
               
    
              
 
 The estimated   coefficients confirm the results from the slope-shift model in column 1. 
There is an increase in sales on plan implementation averaging 10.2% of 1986-87 sales levels. 
Sales gains increase by an additional 2.3% (of 1986-87 sales) in the second year and the gains 
are lower by about 2.6% (of 1986-87 sales) in the fourth quarter. 
 The specification in column 3 of Table 3 permits both slope and intercept shifts as 
described in the full model (1). The significantly positive   ,   , and   , and the significantly 
negative    support our three hypotheses. The three  -tests in the last panel of the table also 
indicate that each of the three hypotheses (                                   
 ) is rejected at the 1% level. 
 To further evaluate the robustness of our results, we reestimated the slope- shift and the 
intercept-shift models allowing for store-specific values of  . By letting the   coefficients vary 
across stores, we allowed for the possibility that the plan impact is different for different stores 
without constraining this differential impact to be proportional to store sales in 1986-87. Results 
of tests evaluating whether the average estimated value of each   over the 15 stores is zero are 
very similar to those reported in Table 3. 
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Sensitivity Analysis 
 
 While our earlier models attribute the increase in sales to the implementation of the 
performance-based incentive plan, other factors may explain this result. We investigate three 
potential alternative explanations: model specification, personal income growth differentials, and 
sales-related expenses. 
 Theoretical research in agency theory does not provide an exact functional form to link 
store sales with agent effort and incentive plan implementation. Therefore, we evaluate the 
robustness of our results by considering alternative model specifications. Monthly sales of all 
plan and nonplan stores move together over time because of regional economic factors, 
seasonality in sales patterns, number of weekends and work days in a month, and company-wide 
advertising and promotions such as for special anniversary sales. Bivariate correlations between 
individual store sales for the 15 sample stores and          over our sample period are high, 
ranging between 93% and 97%, thus indicating that the primary drivers of store sales are 
captured by companywide factors. Therefore, we specify the ratio of store sales to          
as a function of hypothesized incentive plan effects as follows: 
       
         
            
       
    
       
    
 
  
   
     
 
The results in Table 4 reveal that a statistically significant 9.3% increase in relative sales gain 
occurred on plan implementation that increased further by 5.0% in the second year. The 
estimated lower relative sales gain of 1.6% in the fourth quarter is not significant. 
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Insert Table 4 Here 
 
 
 We also consider the possibility that management selected the stores located in high 
growth areas for the initial implementation of the incentive plan so that the measured increase in 
sales for plan stores would exceed that for nonplan stores and, therefore, the implementation of 
the new plan would appear successful. Table 5 reports average statistics for the annual growth 
rates in total personal income for the county in which each store is located, classified by the 
existence of the incentive plan. Over the period from 1984 to 1987, growth in personal income 
was greater for the counties in which plan stores are located than for the counties in which 
nonplan stores are located, but the difference is not statistically significant at conventional levels. 
However, from 1988 to 1990, the average growth rate in county personal income for the plan 
stores is significantly greater than that for the nonplan stores. Because more disposable income is 
believed to translate into more sales, the post-implementation sales gains identified in Tables 3 
and 4 may be driven by differential personal income growth rates. To examine the impact of 
income growth on relative sales we reestimate (3) after including relative income growth terms 
as follows: 
       
         
                     
       
    
 
  
   
 
      
    
       
              
    
         
      
    
             
 
Insert Table 5 Here 
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The additional variable,      , measures the annual growth rate in county personal income for 
a plan store relative to the annual personal income growth rate for the 19 regional stores that did 
not.
11
 This model is based on the assumption that a   increase in relative income growth results 
in a    increase in relative stores sales, and that this impact increases to a         increase 
after plan implementation. 
 Similar to the model in (1), we estimate slope-shift (          ), intercept-shift 
(          ), and both-slope-and-intercept-shifts versions of the model in (4). Two 
results are evident from Table 6. First,       significantly explains relative store sales. The   
values of 0.957 and 0.963 in columns 1 and 2 are not significantly different from 1, indicating 
that relative store sales increase almost proportionately with relative income growth. That is, a 
5% increase in relative income growth results in a nearly 5% increase in relative store sales. 
Second, after controlling for relative income growth, the results in all three columns provide 
strong support for the first two hypotheses. The signs of all estimated   coefficients in the first 
two columns are in the hypothesized direction, but           are not significant.
12
 
 Table 7 presents results of estimating the model obtained by multiplying both sides of (4) 
by         . This provides a model similar to model (1) estimated in Table 3. The regression 
in column 2 is identical to that in column 1 of Table 3 except for the addition of the relative 
growth term with the   coefficient. The estimated   coefficients in this column of Table 7 are 
similar to, though slightly lower than, those obtained in the earlier regression suggesting that 
                                                          
11
 Specifically, if     and     denote the personal incomes in a year y for the county of a store   and the 
entire region   respectively, then                                   where   is the year 
corresponding to the month   and where        and         denote the personal incomes in the year 1987. 
12
 Individual coefficients in column 3 should be interpreted cautiously as Belsley-Kuh-Welsch diagnostics 
indicate high collinearity. The highest condition index is 90 for the regression in column 3, well above the 
highest condition index of 15 for column 3 in Table 3. 
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growth, while important, does not explain all of the increase in sales that coincides with the 
plan’s implementation. Overall, the results in the table support all three of our hypotheses.13 
 An alternative approach to modeling the impact of       on store sales is to assume that 
the coefficient    in model (1) representing the sales of a store   as a multiple of          is 
not invariant over time, and the time-dependent     increase for stores located in counties that 
exhibit a high personal income growth rate and decrease for other stores. To address the 
nonstationarity of    , we write              where    are stationary parameters to be 
estimated. We estimate the following model: 
                                    
  
   
 
      
                
    
          
      
    
               
                  
      
    
                  
      
    
                      
 




Insert Table 7 Here 
 
 
Parameter estimates reported in Table 8 indicate that while all the   coefficients in the first two 
columns have the hypothesized signs, the extent of the plan impact is diminished compared to 
that indicated in Table 3 and hypothesis    is not rejected because we now control for income 
                                                          
13
 The individual coefficients in column 3 of Table 7 should also be interpreted cautiously as the highest 
Belsley-Kuh-Welsch condition index is 156. 
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growth differentials. However, the plan does have a significantly positive and persistent impact 
on sales that is lower in the fourth quarter. Overall, the results in Tables 6, 7, and 8 indicate that, 
while relative income growth is important in explaining store sales, the implementation of the 
performance-based incentive plan resulted in sales gains that increase over time and that these 
gains are lower when there are more temporary salespersons. 
 
 
Insert Table 8 Here 
 
 
 We consider next the possibility that sales managers and consultants in the plan stores 
increased the consumption of sales-related resources to increase sales. The relation of these costs 
to the plan’s sales impact is examined in Table 9. One concern is that sales personnel maintain 
additional inventories on hand to promote sales once the incentive plan is implemented. The 
regression estimates reported in the left column indicate that there was little difference in 
inventory turnover rates before and after the plan’s implementation. 
 There is also the possibility that sales personnel give more price breaks (they are 
authorized to discount merchandise up to 10%), sell less profitable merchandise, or encourage 
customers to purchase (and then return) more goods than they need. All of these factors suggest 
that gross margins erode after the plan’s implementation. There is no evidence, however, of any 
decrease in gross margins as the regression results reported in the middle column of Table 9 
indicate that the cost of goods sold as a percentage of sales remains unchanged after plan 
implementation. 
 Additional sales could also be generated by consuming other company resources. 
Because data for support activity expenses (such as stock handling, security, administration) 
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were not available to us for the first 12 months of our sample period, this regression was 
estimated with data for the remaining 54 months. Results reported in the right column indicate 
that support expenses as a percentage of sales did not change significantly after the plan’s 
implementation. Taken together the results in Table 9 reveal that the sales gains documented 
above are not obtained because of inventory accumulation, margin erosion, or support cost 
inflation. 
 
Insert Table 9 Here 
 
 
 In summary, after considering factors such as income growth, margin reduction, and 
resource consumption that may impact sales, the empirical evidence indicates that sales gains 
occur on the implementation of the incentive plan. The signs of the estimated coefficients are 
remarkably robust across models, all indicating that sales gains increase over time and lower 
gains obtain in the periods when the proportion of temporary employees is high, although the 
statistical significance of the tests differs across models. Overall, the evidence is consistent with 
the notion that the effects of incentives are considered by sales consultants in their decisions to 




 There has been considerable interest in the management accounting literature on the 
theoretical derivation of optimal incentive contracts in a principal-agent setting. A fundamental 
assumption in most agency-theoretic models is that the agents will optimally trade off expected 
increase in incentive compensation against disutility for greater effort. There have not been many 
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attempts, however, to test whether this assumption is supported by empirical observations over a 
long span of time. This need for empirical validation is particularly salient because the richer, 
more complex, theoretical models that consider multi-period consequences of incentive contracts 
impose a great cognitive burden on the agent’s ability to assess effects that are not immediately 
evident. 
 In this paper we have examined the impact of a performance-based compensation plan at 
a firm that operates numerous retail outlets. We find that the implementation of the plan is 
associated with increases in sales that persist and increase over time. As such this finding 
supports the basic agency-theoretic assumption that output increases when agents are rewarded 
for performance. There is also strong evidence that the impact of the incentive contract is lower 
when the proportion of temporary workers is higher. These observations are consistent with the 
permanent sales consultants (but not the temporary workers) optimally assessing the multi-period 
implications of working to develop long-term service relation with customers, or to learn how to 
perform their task more efficiently, which translates into future sales gain. 
 A caveat that must be recognized, however, stems from the limitation that field-based 
research imposes on our ability to control all other factors bearing on the phenomenon being 
studied, and also on our ability to obtain data on such other factors to assess their influence on 
our results. The increase in sales gains documented in our study may be caused by multi-period 
effect of incentives on the consultants’ allocation of effort, or by possibilities such as 
performance-based incentives attracting workers with higher intrinsic ability, improving the 
average performance of the salesforce over time. Data available to us for this study do not allow 
us to discriminate between these alternative ways in which provision of incentives can improve 
organizational performance. Our study is also limited to an analysis of the impact of the 
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compensation plan on sales and some related resources only. We have not examined the overall 
impact of the plan on the firm’s performance to assess whether it is the optimal plan. 
Notwithstanding these caveats, the study illustrates the value of field-based research to help 
evaluate theoretical predictions that ultimately are intended to inform us on the behavior of 
economic agents in the field. 
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Table 1: Average size of retail outlets by incentive plan existence (means, with medians in 
parentheses below). 
 
The mean values reported in the table are disguised by multiplying by a scalar. The statistical 
tests are not affected by this transformation. 
Stores that have implemented the performance-based plan as of the end of the sample period are 
classified as ‘stores with plan’. 
pi(t)   = probability that the means of the two groups are equal. 
p(z)   = probability that the medians of the two groups are equal. 
SQFEET  = square footage of retail store in fiscal year February 1987 to January 1988. 
SALES  = annual sales of retail store in fiscal year (in thousand dollars). 
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Table 2. Mean financial ratios for retail outlets by incentive plan existence.  
 
The mean values reported in the table are disguised by multiplying by a scalar. The statistical 
tests are not affected by this transformation. 
Stores that have implemented the performance-based plan as of the end of the sample period are 
classified as 'stores with plan’. 
p(t)  =  probability that the means of the two groups are equal. 
Support expenses include indirect labor costs for stocking, cleaning, wrapping, and monitoring 
merchandise. 
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Table 3: WLS estimates of impact of incentive plan on sales (f-statistic in parentheses); n = 990, 
15 stores for 66 months from February 1986 to July 1991. 
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Table 4. WLS estimates of impact of incentive plan on relative sales (t-statistic in parentheses); 
n = 990, 15 stores for 66 months from February 1986 to July 1991.  
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Table 6. WLS estimates of impact of incentive plan and income growth on relative sales ((-
statistic in parentheses); n = 990, 15 stores for 66 months from February 1986 to July 1991.
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Table 7. WLS estimates of impact of incentive plan and income growth on sales (t-statistic in 
parentheses); n = 990, 15 stores for 66 months from February 1986 to July 1991
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Table 8. WLS estimates of impact of incentive plan and income growth on sales (r-statistic in 
parentheses); n = 990, 15 stores for 66 months from February 1986 to July 1991 
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Table 9. Impact of incentive plan on expenses (t-statistics in parentheses); n =990, 15 stores for 
66 months from February 1986 to July 1991. 
See Tables 2 and 3 for other variable definitions.  
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Figure 1. Plot of average incremental sales for 15 stores centered around each store’s own date 
of plan implementation. 
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